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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Citizenship and Immigration Services

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OFFICE

CIS, AAO, 20 Mass, 3/F

425 I Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20536

File: WAC 02 025 55742 Office: California Service Center

Date: **JAN 21 2004**

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

Petition: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Skilled Worker or Professional Pursuant to Section 203(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:


INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. *Id.*

Any motion must be filed with the office that originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. § 103.7.


Robert P. Wiemann, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a dental office. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a bookkeeper. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an individual labor certification approved by the Department of Labor. The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the financial ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date of the visa petition.

On appeal, counsel submits a brief and additional evidence, including the petitioner's Form 1120 for 2001.

Section 203(b)(3)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(3)(A)(i), provides for the granting of preference classification to qualified immigrants who are capable, at the time of petitioning for classification under this paragraph, of performing skilled labor (requiring at least two years training or experience), not of a temporary or seasonal nature, for which qualified workers are not available in the United States.

8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements.

Eligibility in this matter hinges on the petitioner's ability to pay the wage offered as of the petition's priority date, which is the date the request for labor certification was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the Department of Labor, and continuing. Here, the petition's priority date is January 14, 1998. The beneficiary's salary as stated on the labor certification is \$14.46 per hour which equates to \$30,076.80 per annum.

Counsel submitted copies of the petitioner's Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Forms 1120 for the years 1998 through 2000. The IRS Forms showed taxable income of \$7,584 for 1998; \$14,201 for 1999; and -\$4,801 for 2000.

The director determined that the evidence submitted did not establish that the petitioner had the ability to pay the proffered wage and denied the petition accordingly.

On appeal, counsel argues, in pertinent part that:

4. Petitioner's 1998 Tax Return shows gross receipts of \$356,202. The Tax Return shows its officers were paid \$100,615 (line 12 of the Tax Return). Petitioner claimed \$15,776 in depreciation cost (line 20 of the Tax Return) and indicated a taxable income of \$6,459 (line 30 of the Tax Return). The major Stockholder of the Petitioner is its president Dr. Ivan F. Martinez and because he is a dentist and major stockholder of the Petitioner his compensation is significant. A written statement by Purita F. Martinez dated August 6, 2002 stating he is the major stockholder of Petitioner is attached as Exhibit "C". The depreciation amount is not an actual business expense incurred by the Petitioner. Therefore, the true "profit" is derived from adding Dr. Martinez's compensation, the depreciation amount, and the taxable income. As such, the Petitioner's 1998 profit was \$122,850, well exceeding the proffered wage of \$30,076.80.

Counsel's argument is not persuasive. The petitioning entity in this case is a corporation. Consequently, any assets of the individual stockholders including ownership of shares in other enterprises or corporations cannot be considered in determining the petitioning corporation's ability to pay the proffered wage. See *Matter of M*, 8 I&N Dec. 24 (BIA 1958; AG 1958); *Matter of Aphrodite Investments Limited*, 17 I&N Dec. 530 (Comm. 1980); and *Matter of Tessel*, 17 I&N Dec. 631 (Act. Assoc. Comm. 1980).

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage, CIS will examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well-established by both CIS and judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citing *Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v.*

Feldman, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984); see also *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F.Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F.Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, the court held CIS had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. 623 F. Supp. at 1084. The court specifically rejected the argument that CIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. Finally, there is no precedent that would allow the petitioner to "add back to net cash the depreciation expense charged for the year." *Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F.Supp. at 537; see also *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F.Supp. at 1054.

The petitioner's IRS Form 1120 for calendar year 1998 shows a taxable income of \$7,584. The petitioner could not pay a proffered wage of \$30,076.80 a year out of this income.

Additionally, although the figure shown as taxable income on the petitioner's 2001 tax return is sufficient to cover the proffered salary, the petitioner's taxable income figures for 1999 and 2000 show an inability to pay the wage offered. As noted previously, the petitioner must demonstrate its continuing ability to pay as of the visa priority date.

Accordingly, after a review of the record, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had sufficient available funds to pay the salary offered as of the priority date of the petition and continuing.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.